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Abstract: 
With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, 
we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we 
provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, 
on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the 
balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional 
environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is 
observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that 
corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure 
point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government 
spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that 
regional corruption significantly reduces inbound foreign direct investment in 
Chinese regions, which indicates that the pollution haven hypothesis may not 
hold in China. This finding sheds a new light on the “China puzzle” that China is 
the largest developing host of FDI while it is appears to be very corrupt. Finally 
we observe that corruption substantially aggravates pollution probably through 
loosening environment regulation, and that it modifies the effects of trade 
openness and FDI on the stringency of environmental policy in a manner 
opposite to that observed in literature to date. 
 
JEL Classifications: D720; H110; K420 








States, whether they are benevolent or repressive are in a position of having control over the 
distribution of benefits and costs and therefore hold a certain level of discretionary power 
which can in turn lead to corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Thus, corruption is a widely 
observe phenomenon in all manner of different societies.  In this paper we are going to focus on 
China. It has been stressed that corruption has become more rampant in China since economic 
reform was launched in 1978. The Chinese Government has admitted that corruption “is now 
worse than during any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has spread into 
the Party, into Government administration and into every part of society, including politics, 
economy, ideology and culture” (Guoqing Liang, 1994, p. 122). Widespread corruption has 
caused severe consequences in China. According to Hu (2001), the economic performance loss 
due to corruption in China was estimated in the late 1990s to be between 13.2 and 16.8% of 
Chinese’s GDP. Although many papers have emerged about corruption in China (e.g., Yao’s 
2002 theoretical paper and Cai, Fang and Xu’s 2009 empirical paper), there is still a lack of 
systematic analysis on the consequences of corruption in China. Such a shortcoming reduces 
the possibility for policy makers to assess the exact magnitude of the harmfulness of corruption 
in China and therefore to derive anti-corruption strategies that are suitable for China.  
      In general, there has been an increasing amount of economic studies on the consequences of 
corruption since the 1990s, most of which focus on the effect of corruption on economic 
development. The transformation of the socialist economies was one of the main reasons for 
this surge in interest since institutional weaknesses and corruption surfaced as major obstacles 
to market reforms and economic development (Abed and Gupta, 2002). Studies have emerged 
which explored the relationship between economic growth and corruption (Mauro, 1995). Most 
of these studies work with cross-sectional data using common corruption proxies such as the 
TI, the ICRG,  the World Bank Quality of Governance ratings (control of corruption) or the 
Global Competitiveness Report. Such indexes reflect an indirect way of measuring corruption 
focusing mainly as Tanzi (2002, p. 39) stresses on “perceptions and not objective and 
quantitative measures of corruption”. Naturally, one can therefore criticize that such data is 
subject to many biases. Treisman (2007), for example, pointed out that corruption perception 
data actually reflects impressions of the intensity of corruption instead of the corruption 
phenomenon itself. It measures beliefs that may be driven by other social and economic 
conditions (see also Knack, 2006). In other words, if the meaning of corruption is subjective, 




level of corruption among countries (Glaeser and Saks, 2006).  This therefore also reduces the 
effectiveness of statistical analysis. Cross-country estimations may also be affected by omitted 
variable biases. Enormous unobservable or unmeasurable differences in institutions and 
cultures between countries may also induce estimation biases. Institutional and cultural 
frameworks that typify specific countries might influence the size of corruption. Such features 
cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. In other words homogeneity reduces 
omitted variable biases. It may therefore be useful to complement such studies with within-
country data. We therefore present within country evidence focusing on China. Interestingly, 
not many studies have used within country data. It certainly requires there to exist a significant 
level of within country variation as well as a regional institutional structure. The U.S. with its 
50 states provides, for example, an interesting case study. Glaeser and Saks (2006) therefore 
explore corruption in America using information on the amount of corruption in each of the 
states in the U.S. to explore state characteristics that are associated with corruption and how 
corruption affects the economic development at the state level. Once one focuses on within 
country data, alternative proxies of corruption can be evaluated. The strength is the ability to 
focus on more concrete measures of corruption. Glaeser and Saks (2006) use the number of 
government officials convicted for corruption practices through the Federal justice department. 
The obvious shortcoming of such a variable is that the proxy is driven by the quality and 
efficiency of the judicial system itself. If the judicial system is inefficient or even corrupt, a 
large share of corrupt activities remains unobserved. Regional differences in the efficiency of 
the judicial system may also bias within country comparisons. One way to deal with this 
problem is to focus, as done by Glaeser and Saks (2006), on federal convictions where one can 
assume that the federal judicial system is relatively isolated from local corruption, therefore 
treating similar people across regions or in their case across states. Nevertheless, it is still 
unclear whether and to what extent local information and efforts have helped to reveal 
corruption that was treated at the federal judicial system.  
      Studying China may provide similar advantages. On the one hand, China is a centralized 
country with unified legal and administrative systems, which is dominated by the Han 
nationality with Confucian values in most of its regions (for the detailed evidence, see 
http://english.gov.cn/about.htm). Specifically, in China the heads of local governments are 
actually determined by the central government. Moreover their promotions depend mainly on 
whether they can faithfully carry out the regulations and policies of the central government. 
Furthermore the Supreme People's Court supervises local people's courts and actually exerts 




people's courts. In addition to this the Supreme People's Procuratorate has a similar but an even 
stronger impact on local people's procuratorates. All of these factors ensure the homogeneity of 
the Chinese political and judicial systems across the various regions. It therefore also minimizes 
the potentially omitted bias in the econometric analysis. On the other hand, there are great 
economic differences between the rich Eastern provinces and the poor Western provinces. The 
American data, which focuses on states, reduces the possibility of generalizing the results to 
global differences in corruption and on the economic development across countries. Glaeser 
and Saks (2006, p. 1054), for example, state: “No state today is as poor or as corrupt as many 
countries in the developing world, and so relying on variation across the states in the US limits 
research to a small part of the distribution of both independent and dependent variables”. 
Compared to the U.S., we observe in China a stronger variance in the economic conditions 
which may help to increase the generalizability of the results. Table 1, for example, shows that 
the GDP per capita of Shanghai, which is close to that of Hungary, is nearly nine times as high 
as the GDP per capita of Guizhou province, which approximates that of Cameroon.  
 
 Table 1  
 GDP (PPP) per capita of Chinese regions in 2008 (Intl. $) 
  Beijing  16577    Anhui  3810  Chongqing  4741 
  Tianjin  14590    Fujian  7922    Sichuan  4044 
  Hebei  6112    Jiangxi  3887    Guizhou  2321 
  Shanxi  5365    Shandong  8701    Yunnan  3310 
  Inner Mongolia  8472    Henan  5153    Tibet  3646 
  Liaoning  8221    Hubei  5223    Shaanxi  4799 
  Jilin  6184    Hunan  4608    Gansu  3185 
  Heilongjiang  5714  Guangdong  9886    Qinghai  4573 
  Shanghai  19232    Guangxi  3936    Ningxia  4706 
  Jiangsu  10421    Hainan  4517    Xinjiang  5232 
  Zhejiang  11102         
 
The key innovative aspect of our paper is hence to provide within country rather than cross-
country evidence, focusing on the impact of corruption on the development in China using both 
provincial and city-level data. The diversity of China allows us to explore corruption in a 
within-country environment. This can therefore be better controlled than cross-country studies 
for unobserved culture or institutional differences, since it holds them constant. Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) found a weak negative association between corruption and economic growth in the 




bribery is negatively correlated with firm growth. With  a survey of Chinese firms (World 
Bank, 2007), Cai, Fang and Xu (2009) employed the entertainment and travel cost of Chinese 
firms as a proxy for corruption measure and found that corruption substantially decreases firm 
performance in China. We will conduct a similar empirical approach as Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) to increase the comparability of the results. Our paper is structured as follows: Section II 
reviews related literature. Section III presents empirical analysis. Section IV concludes.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corruption has significant influences on many aspects of societies (Lambsdorff, 2005). We will 
focus here on its impact on economic development, which is a major concern in China since it 
is the largest developing country in the world. According to Deardorff (2006), and Myint and 
Krueger (2009)
1, economic development is the increase in the economic, political, and social 
well-being of people in a country with sustained growth from a simple, poor country into a 
modern, prosperous country. Its scope includes economic growth, income distribution, public 
goods (public expenditures) and environmental quality. Here we will provide a short literature 
review on the influence of corruption in these subareas of economic development. 
      Economic  growth  is  a  fundamental  part of economic development. Economic growth 
always improves the living standard of the public by increasing both private income and social 
services.  Poor countries may experience economic growth without development in some cases. 
No country, however, can sustain economic development without growth. It is therefore 
important to investigate the impact of corruption on economic growth when studying the 
relationship between corruption and economic development. There is indeed a theoretical 
debate in existence on the effect of corruption on economic growth. Some authors emphasize 
that corruption can promote economic growth (“grease the wheels”). Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968) argue that bribes can be used as an incentive instrument to influence public 
officials, inducing an improvement in the quality of civil services. Lui (1985) also shows in his 
model that bribes can efficiently accelerate the bureaucratic process. However, one can criticize 
that bureaucrats have an incentive to delay transactions in order to extract higher payments (see 
Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Other researchers stress that corruption decreases economic growth 
(“sand the wheels”). For example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) point out that most 
                                                            
1    Deardorff, A., 2006. Economic development. Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics.  
(http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/e.html) 





talented people are allocated into rent-seeking activities instead of productive ones in corrupt 
societies. It therefore lowers economic growth since the unproductive rent seeking activities 
only bring positive returns to the rent seekers instead of to the whole society (Krueger, 1974). 
From a different angle, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) stated that corrupt officials may distort 
investment projects to those offering better opportunities for corruption. In other words, corrupt 
bureaucracy will not award the services to the most efficient producers, but instead to the 
producer who offers the largest bribes. In general, most of the empirical literature supports a 
negative association between corruption and economic growth. Mauro (1995) finds empirically 
that corruption lowers productive investment significantly thus also reducing economic growth. 
Mo (2001) reports further that through the channels of political instability, the level of human 
capital and the share of private investment, corruption significantly hinders economic growth. 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) also provide evidence that corruption reduces economic growth 
via its effect on investment and trade policy. Recently, a number of studies stress that the 
correlation between corruption and growth is conditional on the institutional quality. Meon and 
Sekkat (2005) observe that corruption depresses economic growth especially in countries with a 
low quality of governance. However, Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) find a quadratic 
relationship between corruption and growth in free countries instead of not-free ones, which 
implies the existence of the growth maximizing level of corruption. Aidt, Dutta and Sena 
(2008) using a threshold model report that corruption exerts a significant negative effect on 
economic growth in regimes with good governance, while having no effect on growth in 
regimes with poor governance. Moreover, Meon and Weill (2008) provide empirical evidence 
using a panel of 54 countries that corruption is beneficial (or at least less harmful) in countries 
with weak institutions. These papers provide indirect evidence that supports the “grease the 
wheels” hypothesis insofar as corruption is only beneficial in weak institutions while being 
harmful elsewhere (Aidt, 2009).   
      As an engine of economic growth, foreign direct investment is suggested to be negatively 
correlated with corruption in previous literature. Field, Sosa and Wu (2006) employed a Nash 
bargaining game to find that the corruption in a host country influences the competitiveness of 
foreign firms and thus also affects their expected profits in the host market.  Consequently the 
decisions of foreign firms to invest in a country are affected by the corruption level of the host. 
Empirically, using two-year bilateral flows between 14 source and 45 host countries, Wei 
(2000a) found a significantly negative association between perceived corruption in hosts and 
inbound foreign direct investment. Corruption acts like a tax on FDI reducing the attractiveness 




inbound FDI and moves the ownership structure to joint ventures. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
utilized a sample of 89 countries to found the negative effect of corruption on FDI, while 
Akcay (2001) failed to identify a statistically significant link between corruption and FDI.   
Furthermore, Egger and Winner (2005) analysed the impact of corruption on FDI with a sample 
of 73 countries and detected a clear positive relationship between corruption and inward FDI. 
However, noting that FDI is an indicator of openness, Larrain and Tavares (2004, 2007) 
presented cross-country evidence that there exists reverse causation between corruption and 
FDI. Due to the regional data and regional differences in China we will be able to explore the 
relationship between corruption and FDI within a country rather than focusing on cross-country 
evidence.  
      There  is  a  related  strand  of  literature testing the “pollution havens” hypothesis which 
according to Javorcik and Wei (2004), refers to the tendency of multinational corporations to 
relocate to countries with lax environment policies. Recently some researchers have 
emphasized the impact of corruption of host countries when studying the relationship between 
FDI and the stringency of the environment policies of host countries. Modelling the interaction 
between workers, environmentalists and bureaucrats, Fredriksson, List and Millimet (2003) 
theoretically predicted that corruption influences FDI through two channels: public spending 
and environmental regulation.  With US state-level panel data, they provided empirical 
evidence that corruption affects both the supply of public goods and the stringency of 
environmental regulation which eventually influences the FDI location in America. Similarly, 
Javorcik and Wei (2004) studied 25 economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
and found that besides its direct impediment to FDI, corruption may relax environmental 
regulation in host countries.  
      As  an  important  indicator  of  economic  development, income inequality also influences 
economic growth (Barro, 2000). Corruption, however, is observed to significantly affect the 
income inequality. As discussed, in many countries today and in the past, people choose to be 
active as bureaucrats, as army officers or in other rent seeking activities instead of working in 
the potentially more productive or entrepreneurial activities (Nabla-Norris and Wade, 2002). 
Better connected people in society have increased opportunity and incentives to bribe and 
belong mainly to the high-income groups within a country (Tanzi, 1995). This could lead to a 
reduction in the level of social services available to the poor (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). For 
example, in China under the Mandarins, as in medieval Europe, wealthy individuals in society 
choose their principal career in government services where it was possible to generate bribes 




in the absence of credit markets only wealthy agents have the chance o overcome the 
nonconvexity in income-earning possibilities (“born into rent-seeking”, p. 454). Li, Xu and Zou 
(2000) used a variant of the rent-seeking model developed by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) to conclude that corruption influences income inequality in a reversed U-shape way. 
Furthermore, they presented empirical evidence to support this although the quadratic terms of 
corruption indicators were not significant in most of their specifications (Begovic, 2006).  In 
general, however, we still observe a lack of empirical evidence on how corruption affects 
income inequality. Based on the discussion about the channels through which corruption 
influences income inequality, Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) provided robust cross-
country evidence that corruption monotonically increases income inequality. We add to the 
literature an analysis that uses within country data instead of cross-country data to better isolate 
the unobserved institutional and cultural factors.   
      Public expenditure actually has a twofold effect on economic development. On the one 
hand, Public expenditures such as those on infrastructure, education and science stimulate 
economic growth. On the other hand, public expenditures such as those on health and other 
social services improve the social wellbeing of the public. Corruption can substantially 
influence public expenditure. It can “adversely affect the provision of publicly provided social 
services” (Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson, 2002, p. 245). Mauro (1998) stresses that measuring 
the effects of corruption on the composition of government expenditure may help to quantify 
the severity of the principal-agent problem between citizens and politicians. He argued that 
corrupt politicians may increase the government expenditure that it is easier to collect bribes 
from and decrease the expenditure which provides fewer bribery opportunities. For example, 
corrupt officials will choose goods whose exact value is difficult to monitor to maintain secrecy 
(e.g., high-technology goods, large infrastructure projects, health equipment). Moreover, 
classical rents such as the allocation of transfer and welfare payments enjoy substantial 
discretionary power. Mauro (1998) presented evidence that corruption significantly reduces 
government expenditure on education due to the fact that education does not provide as many 
lucrative opportunities for corrupt officials compared to other spending components. 
Corruption also reduces spending on operations and maintenance and increases large 
government capital spending (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). On the other hand, Gupta, de Mello 
and Sharan (2001) using a panel of 120 countries during 1985–1998, found that corruption is 
positively correlated with government spending on the military.  
      Corruption not only affects government expenditure but also affects government revenues, 




without good representation. If taxpayers perceive that their interests (preferences) are not 
properly represented in political institutions and they receive a reduced or an inefficient supply 
of public goods, their willingness to contribute (e.g., pay taxes) decreases. A state in which 
corruption is rampant is one in which citizens have little trust in authority and thus have a low 
incentive to cooperate. Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999) theoretically deduced that collusion 
between the taxpayer and the tax inspector through bribery reduces tax revenue. Ghura (1998) 
studied 39 sub-Saharan countries in the period 1985–1996 and obtained evidence that 
corruption lowers the tax revenue-GDP ratio in those countries. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) also 
support the negative relationship between corruption and government revenue in their cross-
country analysis. Recently, Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2008) provide strong 
evidence that corruption has a negative impact on tax performance in developing and developed 
countries. 
      Now  we  turn  to  the  relationship  between corruption and the environment quality, an 
important qualitative indicator of economic development. Lopez and Mitra (2000) studied 
cooperative and non-cooperative interactions between government and private firms and 
conclude that introducing corruption moves the Kuznets environmental curve up: the pollution 
level corresponding to every income level is constantly above the socially optimal level due to 
corruption. Considering both the direct effect of corruption on pollution and the indirect effect 
of corruption which influences pollution by reducing per capita income, Welsch (2004) found 
with simultaneous equations that the direct effect of corruption on pollution was positive while 
the indirect effect of corruption is either positive or negative and was also numerically smaller. 
Therefore corruption aggravates pollution overall, especially in developing countries. However, 
with the similar empirical strategy but controlling the endogeneity problems in regressions, 
Cole (2007) provides cross-country evidence that the positive direct impact of corruption on air 
pollution emissions is dominated by the negative indirect impact of corruption. The total effect 
of corruption on air pollution emissions is hence negative in the countries that are not the 
richest. This contradicting evidence demands an investigation into the actual mechanism for the 
relationship between corruption and pollution. 
      It  is  quite  possible  that  bureaucratic corruption affects pollution mainly through 
environment policy making, since special interest groups often exert undue influence on policy 
makers by lobbying and offering bribes. This is another symptom of corruption. Several studies 
about the influence of corruption on the formation of environment policy have therefore 
emerged. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) found empirically  in a cross sectional sample of 62 




in magnitude than that of democracy on the stringency of the environment policy. Furthermore 
they suggested that democracy might affect the environment policy stringency through 
reducing corruption. Considering the interactions between corruption and political stability, 
trade liberalization and FDI respectively, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), Damania, 
Fredriksson and List (2003) and Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) provided both theoretical 
evidence from the lobbying models and empirical evidence from the cross-country analyses that 
corruption not only significantly reduces the stringency of environmental policy but also 
modifies the effects of other determinants of environment policy such as political stability, 
trade liberalization and FDI. Furthermore Fredriksson, Vollebergh and Dijkgraaf (2004) 
adopted a similar approach to find theoretically and empirically that corruption reduces the 
stringency of energy policy thus lowering energy efficiency. Indeed, the existing literature on 
the linkage between corruption and the stringency of environmental policy concludes that 
institutional quality influences the way policy makers respond to environmental concerns. Since 
the formation of environmental policy is likely to be ‘representative of many other forms of 
government decision making’ (Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003), results here might be 
illuminative in the research of the relationship between corruption and other public policies.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1   Data and Methodology 
China is administratively divided into 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities, 
all of which are placed directly under the Central Government. A province or an autonomous 
region is subdivided into (autonomous) prefectures and/or prefecture-level cities. In this paper 
we will use two different regional data sets to explore the causes of corruption in China. The 
first one is a province-level data set which consists of all 31 provincial areas in the mainland of 
China. To ensure the comparability of the data, we collected data only from 1998 to 2007 as the 
definition and hence the statistical calibre of the crime of corruption and bribery which was 
changed in 1997 due to an amendment to the Criminal Law of China. It should also be noted 
that we have not included data from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan due to the obvious 
differences in the political and legal systems between these areas and other parts of China. 
      Corruption data was derived from the China Procuratorial Yearbooks. We collected the 
number of annual registered cases on corruption in procurator’s office by region. Glaeser and 
Saks (2006, p. 1058) state: “Because the conviction data are less subjective, cover a longer time 




believe that using these data has distinct advantages over the survey-based evidence”. We then 
divided these registered cases by the regional population in order to obtain the regional 
registered corruption cases rate per 100,000 people. An overview of ranking corruption levels 
by region is presented in Table 2. We can observe there is a fairly wide degree of variation 
across regions ranging from 1.77 in Tibet to 5.01 in Tianjin
2.    
     
 
Table 2 
 Average annual registered cases on corruption per capita across regions in China (1998-2007) 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Tianjin  5.01 Shaanxi  3.15 Yunnan  2.61 
Heilongjiang 4.77  Qinghai 3.08  Hunan  2.59 
Jilin  4.50 Ningxia  3.08 Hainan  2.59 
Liaoning  4.12 Hubei  3.05 Beijing  2.59 
Shanxi  3.83 Guizhou  2.95 Chongqing  2.49 




2.77 Sichuan  2.35 
Xinjiang 3.41  Shanghai 2.77  Gansu  2.05 
Fujian  3.40 Jiangsu  2.71 Guangdong  2.05 
Henan 3.35  Guangxi  2.64 Tibet  1.77 
Jiangxi 3.29         
 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) have shown that the conviction rates they used are positively 
correlated with the survey of state house reporters’ perception of public corruption. In our case, 
we check the robustness by using an alternative proxy for corruption. The second data set we 
use is a data set of 120 prefecture-level cities in China which comes mainly from the survey on 
the investment climate of Chinese prefecture-level cities conducted by World Bank and the 
Enterprise Survey Organization of China in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). The survey sampled 100 
industrial firms in each city (except in four municipalities where 200 industrial firms were 
sampled) to evaluate the investment climate of 120 cities covering almost all of the Chinese 
provinces. In their paper, Cai, Fang and Xu (2009) used the entertainment and travel costs 
relative to the sales of firms as an indirect measure of corruption in Chinese firms since 
“Chinese managers commonly use the entertainment and travel costs accounting category to 
                                                            
2 We here do not use the provincial number of officials investigated in registered cases on corruption per 100,000 population to 
measure the regional corruption levels in China, which might be closer to the approach of Glaeser and Saks (2006) since this 
corruption measure is only available in the period from 2003 to 2007.  However, the extremely high correlation between this 
measure and the provincial number of registered cases on corruption per 100,000 population ensures the qualification of the 




reimburse expenditures used to bribe government officials, to entertain clients and suppliers, or 
to accommodate managerial excess” (Cai, Fang and Xu, 2009, p.1). Similar to them, we will, in 
our second data set, utilize the average value of this measure of firms investigated in the above 
survey in a city as a proxy for the corruption level of the city. The detailed description of other 
variables in our second set is listed in the appendix.  
There are two main problems in our econometric analysis. The first is that of the data 
noise. Glaeser and Saks (2006) found “the annual fluctuations in convictions to be too noisy to 
identify any interesting relationships” (p. 1062). We address the similar problem of our first 
panel data set in two ways. First, similar to Glaeser and Saks (2006), we use the five-year 
averages of all variables to eliminate data noise, and then to estimate the cross-sectional 
regressions. This approach, although it effectively reduces data noise, leads to a small sample 
size (31). The second approach we adopt to control for data noise is to run the fixed-effects 
panel analysis thereby controlling both time fixed effects and regional fixed effects. This 
approach can make use of a large sample while its effect on data noise is a bit weaker. The 
second problem we may find in our analysis is the endogeneity problem, which will be 
discussed in detail later. There are two approaches addressing the endogeneity problem in 
econometrics: the fixed-effects and the instrumental variables approaches. The fixed-effects 
regression can only effectively control for endogeneity due to time invariant effects, while the 
IV approach is able to address the endogeneity due to both time invariant effects and to time 
varying effects. In summary, to control for both the data noise and the potential endogeneity 
bias in our provincial analysis, we have run fixed-effects regressions in our panel analysis and 
adopted an IV approach, namely instrument provincial corruption levels with geographic 
factors, in our cross-sectional analysis with the five-year averages of all variables. Since there 
are no concerns of data noise in our second cross-sectional data set of Chinese cities, we will 
adopt the IV approach whenever needed in order to resolve the potential endogeneity problem 
in this analysis. Details will be discussed later. 
 
3.2   Corruption, Economic Growth and Income Distribution 
We first test the effect of corruption upon economic growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) 
identified in their cross-country analysis three variables robust in determining growth: the 
initial level of real GDP per capita related to the conditional convergence hypothesis, the 
average share of investment in GDP, the education attainment as a proxy for human capital. 




economic growth when studying the relationship between corruption and growth. Since China 
is now a newly industrialized country, the difference in industrialization among the various 
Chinese regions might be an important reason for the difference in economic growth within 
them. Our specification for the investigation of the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in China therefore is,  
 
Growth Rate of Regional GRP per Capita = β0 + β1•Initial Regional GRP per Capital 
                                                     + β2•Regional Investment Ratio+ β3•Regional Education Attainment 
                                  + β4•Regional Trade Openness + β5•Regional Corruption Rate 
 
where we measure regional trade openness using the ratio of import and export to the gross 
regional product and regional education attainment as the regional share of the population with 
college completed. The Gross Regional Product will henceforth be referred to as GRP. 
      We  start  with  the  common  specification without the corruption variable to test the 
appropriateness of our basic specification for the explanation of economic growth. Then we 
focus on the relationship between corruption and economic growth. We run OLS regressions at 
first to obtain the cross-sectional results since there seems to be no evidence of the reverse 
causality from economic growth to corruption in literature
3. Since short-term shocks might 
mask the long-term growth tendency, we employ the average growth rate during the period 
from 1998 to 2007 as the dependent variable in the cross-sectional regressions. After 
completing the cross-sectional analysis, we apply the fixed-effect panel estimation to address 
the potential omitted bias.  
Results are presented in Table 3. Results in columns (2) and (5) are in line with the 
consensus in growth regressions (Levine and Renelt, 1992).  This justifies our specification. In 
Table 3, the negative parameter on initial income level indicates income convergence among 
regions in China. Investment and industrialization strongly encourage economic development, 
while education and openness insignificantly promote economic growth. The substantially 
negative effect of the West dummy, however, reflects the fact that Western regions in China lag 
far behind other regions in economic development. More importantly, similar to Mo (2001) and 
                                                            
3 In Mauro (1995), there is no significant difference between the results of OLS and IV approach about the impact of corruption 
on economic growth. Mo (2001) also argued that economic growth is unlikely to exert a direct effect on the corruption level in 
cross-sectional studies as “corruption is commonly considered an institutional problem that lasts for a long period.” 





Glaeser and Saks (2004), our regressions only provide weak evidence that corruption retards 
economic growth in China. As can be seen, the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 3 
Effect of average corruption rate on economic growth: cross-province evidence 
  Average Growth Rate (1998-2007)    Annual Growth Rate (1998-2007) 
 OLS    Fixed  effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cases -0.0011    -0.0062*    -0.0032    -0.0010 
 (0.0025)    (0.0037)    (0.0027)    (0.0023) 
Income     -0.023*  -0.018*      -0.016**  -0.016** 
   (0.011)  (0.0096)      (0.0076)  (0.0076) 
Education   0.0048  0.0060      0.00065  0.00083 
   (0.0058)  (0.0061)      (0.0043)  (0.0043) 
Investment  0.16***  0.17***     0.12***  0.12*** 
   (0.056)  (0.056)      (0.020)  (0.021) 
Openness     0.012  0.0025      0.0053  0.0048 
   (0.0092)  (0.0090)      (0.0078)  (0.0081) 
Industrialization     0.00074**  0.0011***      0.054**  0.058** 
   (0.00032)  (0.00035)      (0.026)  (0.028) 
West   -0.025**  -0.028**         
   (0.011)  (0.011)         
Constant 0.12***  0.21**  0.18**    0.12***  0.16**  0.16** 
 (0.0088)  (0.079)  (0.067)   (0.011)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Observations 31 31  31    310  310  310 
R-squared 0.005  0.38  0.46    0.10  0.54  0.54 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The education 
attainment is henceforth expressed in logarithm. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year in 
our panel estimations hereafter, except that income variable in Columns (5) & (6) is lagged by two 
years. In the cross-sectional provincial regressions, Income is measure by its value in 1997 here. 
Corruption is henceforth gauged by its average value during 1998-2002. All other explanatory 
variables are measured with their averages for the period 1998-2007 respectively. 
  
Now we use the alternative corruption measure, the average entertainment and travel costs 
relative to the sales of sample firms in Chinese cities (ETC hereafter), from the city-level data 
set to re-examine the relationship between corruption and economic growth in China. Cai, Fang 
and Xu (2009) found that “ETC is a mix that includes ‘grease money’ to get better government 
services, ‘protection money’ to lower tax rates” (p.2), as well as other expenditures. They 
observed that some components of ETC promote firm performance though the overall effect of 
ETC is negative. They, however, recognize that their firm-level findings do not necessarily 
mean that ETC expenditures are socially “grease the wheels” or “sands the wheels”. We will 
make an attempt here to locate the social influence of ETC as an indirect corruption measure by 
exploring its effect on regional economic growth.  




Since the corruption measure here comes from industrial firms, we will therefore focus on its 
effect on the growth rate of the industrial output per capita in cities, which is highly correlated 
with the growth rate of the GDP per capita.  Data availability here allows us to adopt a richer 
specification than in provincial analysis. Following Fisman and Svensson (2007), we control 
the average tax burden of firms in cities, measured by the average taxes and fees relative to firm 
sales, in our regressions. Furthermore the industrial contribution to GDP is also added to 
represent the industrialization of cities. In addition to this we use average city road mileage per 
10000 people in 2004 to proxy for the infrastructure endowment of Chinese cities in regressions 
since Demurger (2001) emphasized the effect of infrastructure on economic development in 
China. Due to the lack of education data, we however employ local public library collections 
per 100 people in 2003 to proxy for general education levels in cities.  
 
Table 4 
Effect of average ETC on economic growth: cross-city evidence 
  Growth rate of industrial output per capita (2004-2007) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ETC -0.034  -0.019      -0.059 
 (0.042)  (0.040)      (0.039) 
Loan pay      0.0051*    0.0077** 
     (0.0031)    (0.0033) 
Red tape        -0.0011*  -0.0016** 
       (0.00065)  (0.00070) 
Tax   -0.037**  -0.041***  -0.035**  -0.025 
   (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Industrial output per capita    -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.12***  -0.11*** 
   (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
Investment   0.38***  0.41***  0.39***  0.48*** 
   (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Openness   0.00015  0.00019  0.00013  0.00016 
   (0.00031)  (0.00031)  (0.00031)  (0.00030) 
Education   0.00030  0.00033  0.00034  0.00035 
   (0.00023)  (0.00022)  (0.00025)  (0.00024) 
Industrialization   0.0060**  0.0067***  0.0060***  0.0050** 
   (0.0024)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0024) 
Infrastructure   0.0035  0.0098  -0.00041  0.0021 
   (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
Constant 0.76***  1.66***  1.55***  1.64***  1.51*** 
 (0.049)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.26) 
Observations 120  118  118  118  118 
R-squared 0.01  0.32  0.33  0.33  0.37 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ETC, Loan pay,  
Red tape, and Tax are derived from World Bank (2007). Investment, Openness, and 
Industrialization are measured by their averages in the period 2004-2007 respectively. Education 
and Infrastructure are henceforth represented by their values in 2003 and 2004 respectively. And 





Results in Table 4 generally support those in Table 3. The coefficient of initial industrial output 
per capita is significantly negative. Investment and industrialization substantially promote 
economic growth, while education and openness insignificantly encourage economic 
development. In addition, we find in Table 4 that consistent with Fisman and Svensson (2007), 
the average tax burden here substantially lowers economic growth, while the effect of regional 
infrastructure stock on economic growth seems ambiguous. More importantly, similar to our 
finding in Table 3, corruption measured by ETC also has an insignificantly negative effect on 
regional economic performance.  
However, the share of firms which believe in the need for informal payment to obtain bank 
loans in cities (Loan pay), which in turn can be treated as another indirect corruption measure 
though constrained to the credit area, does have a significantly positive effect on economic 
growth (“greases the wheels”). Since the informal payment to obtain bank loans as discussed 
previously is one of the “grease money” components of the ETC measure, the reason for the 
positive effect of the measure might be that the larger share of firms which believe in the need 
for informal payment to obtain bank loans in Chinese cities is correlated with a larger 
opportunity for firms there to illicitly circumvent the appraisals of banks most of which are 
state-owned in order to finally obtain loans. Compared to those in cities where banks are not 
corrupt, the firms in cities with corrupt banks make more informal payment to bank officials 
and hence have easier access to bank loans though at some cost.  They consequently also grow 
faster. 
      Furthermore, we also found that government red tape proxied by the average days per year 
that enterprise staff must spend interacting with government bureaucracies in cities (Red tape) 
significantly impedes economic growth. It is natural that firms in cities with more bureaucratic 
red tape have to spend more time and money to go through or circumvent the red tape. The 
money that firms have spent on red tape is of course one of the “protection money” parts of 
ETC. This kind of “protection money” has a socially negative effect on economic performance 
(“sands the wheels”) by a wasting productive resource although an individual firm might 
benefit from it. It hence can also be labelled as the “sand money”. 








Decomposition of effect of average ETC on economic growth 
  Average ETC of firms    Growth of industrial output per capita 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
Loan  pay  0.12***         
  (0.0085)         
Red  tape    0.017***        
    (0.00087)        
Grease component        0.043*    0.052**  [0.160] 
       (0.026)    (0.026)   
Sand component          -0.067*  -0.082**  [-0.161] 
         (0.039)  (0.041)   
Tax       -0.041***  -0.035**  -0.035**  [-0.272] 
        (0.0140) (0.0149) (0.0147)  
Industrial output per capita        -0.13***  -0.12***  -0.12***  [-0.685] 
        (0.033) (0.030) (0.031)  
Investment        0.41*** 0.39*** 0.44*** [0.304] 
       (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)   
Openness        0.00019 0.00013 0.00017 [0.075] 
        (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00031)  
Education        0.00033 0.00034 0.00037 [0.114] 
        (0.00022) (0.00025) (0.00025)  
Industrialization       0.0067*** 0.0060*** 0.0062*** [0.290] 
        (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022)  
Infrastructure       0.0098  -0.00041  0.0048  [0.013] 
        (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)  
Constant        1.55*** 1.64*** 1.52***  
       (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.27)   
Observations  120  120   118 118 118  
R-squared  0.71  0.79   0.33 0.33 0.35  
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Beta coefficients in brackets. 
       
 
Though ETC includes both “grease money” and “sand money” (“protection money”) as 
discussed before, it is very difficult to completely isolate the two components of ETC since we 
do not know the detailed composition of ETC of each firm. We will nonetheless try to explore 
whether the overall corruption measure: ETC greases and sands the wheels simultaneously in 
Chinese cities since it includes both “grease” and “sand” components. As discussed above the 
Loan pay variable and the Red tape variable are highly correlated with both the “grease” 
component and the “sand” component of ETC respectively. We hence first run two regressions 
where ETC is a dependent variable and the Loan pay (grease aspect) and the Red tape (sand 
component) are the independent factors respectively (see column (1) and (2) in Table 5).  Then 
we use the predictions of ETC as proxies for the “grease” and “sand” component of ETC 
respectively into the previous growth regressions to test their effects on economic growth. 




ETC does have a significant positive effect on the economic growth of Chinese cities, while the 
proxy for the “sand” part of ETC indeed has a substantial negative impact on economic growth 
showing similar relative strengths when looking at the standardized (beta) coefficients. Such a 
result is consistent with our previous finding that the corruption measured by ETC has an 
overall insignificant negative effect on growth.  
In summary, these results indicate that corruption greases and sands the wheels 
simultaneously. The overall effect of corruption on growth depends on which effect dominates. 
It seems that in China there is a non robust or even insignificant relationship in many cases 
between growth and corruption. This has been observed by Mauro (1995) and Mo (2001), 
among others. Recently Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) documented that the effect of corruption 
on economic growth depends on the quality of the political institutions.  Moreover Adit, Dutta 
and Sena (2008) further observed that corruption has a substantial negative effect on growth in 
countries with high quality institutions, while it has an insignificant impact on economic growth 
in countries with low quality institutions.  
      In general, studies fail to explore single elements of corruption. An analysis as the one done 
here decomposing potential elements can provide new insights in the literature. It therefore 
appears that corruption can have both positive and negative effects and that the overall effect 
may depend on the balance between components, which is probably determined by the 
institutional quality
4.  
     An important issue that relates to economic growth is one of income distribution.  This is 
also a key aspect of economic development. We will here turn to investigate the association 
between corruption and that of income distribution. Since we only have the Gini coefficients of 
Chinese provinces before 2001, we have to find alternative measures of income inequality in 
our cross-section provincial analysis. Kanbur and Zhang (1999) and Sicular, Yue, Gustafsson 
and Li (2007) have found that the urban-rural income gap is the main source of the overall 
inequality in China. We therefore use this income gap as a proxy for regional income inequality 
in China. We employ the ratio of the per capita annual consumption expenditure of urban 
households to that of rural households to measure the income gap in our provincial cross-
section analysis. Due to the lack of data, we will not investigate the linkage between corruption 
and income inequality at the city level. 
 
                                                            
4 Actually the corruption measure in our first province-level data set: the regional registered cases on corruption in procurator’s 
office, is also a comprehensive corruption measure since officials involved in corruption cases probably accept “grease money” 





           Table 6 
          Effects of corruption on economic inequality: cross-province evidence 
 Province-level   
  Consumption expenditure ratio 
(2003-2007) 
 Gini  Coefficient 
(1999-2000) 
 
 OLS    2SLS    POLS    FE   
  (1)  (2)   (3)    (4) 
Corruption  0.20*   0.31*   0.015**    0.014** 
  (0.11)   (0.17)   (0.0059)    (0.0055) 
Income  -0.96***   -0.97***   -0.0047    0.00010 
  (0.21)   (0.19)   (0.020)    (0.019) 
Education  0.093***    0.11**   -0.0034   -0.00086 
  (0.028)   (0.044)   (0.0025)    (0.0023) 
  Openness    1.13***   1.29***   0.032    0.030 
  (0.29)   (0.35)   (0.021)    (0.031) 
Industrialization    0.080    -0.33   -0.15*   -0.14 
  (1.11)   (0.71)   (0.082)    (0.11) 
Expenditure  3.74***   3.81***   -0.18    -0.48** 
  (0.84)   (0.78)   (0.17)    (0.19) 
Urbanization  -2.47***   -3.16***   0.020    0.0010 
  (0.74)   (1.21)   (0.026)    (0.029) 
Constant  10.46***   10.44***   0.34*   0.36* 
  (1.66)   (1.47)   (0.17)    (0.19) 
Observations  31   31   56    56 
R-squared  0.73       0.26   0.60 





We have adopted a specification similar to Li, Xu and Zou (2000) in order to examine the 
relationship between corruption and income inequality. To address the reverse causality from 
income inequality to corruption we have introduced the latitudes of provincial capitals as an 
instrument for provincial corruption levels since the latitudes are obviously exogenous and 
highly correlated with provincial corruption levels. It should be noted that the results in Table 6 
are consistent with Li, Xu and Zou (2000) and Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) in 
that corruption substantially increases income inequality. As to other explanatory variables, 
income basically has a negative impact on income equality, which is in line with most previous 
findings. Furthermore openness generally increases income inequality, which is also consistent 




3.3    Corruption and Inbound Foreign Direct Investment 
Mauro (1995), Mo (2001), and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) have documented the fact that 




“Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth” (Mauro, 1995, 
p.681). We will focus here on the effect of corruption upon a special kind of investment: 
foreign direct investment. Does corruption deter inward foreign direct investment in China as 
some prior literature would suggest? According to Wei (2000a, b), China seems to be a puzzle 
in terms of its relationship between corruption and FDI inflows. China has been the largest 
developing host of FDI for 16 consecutive years while simultaneously being reported in 
international surveys as being severely corrupt. Wei (2000b) performs a cross-country analysis 
including a Chinese dummy and concludes that “corruption is just as damaging to FDI into 
China as it is elsewhere” (p.321) basing this statement on the fact that coefficients on the 
corruption variable and the Chinese dummy in regressions are significantly negative. This 
insightful finding, however, is not fully convincing. The negative coefficient on corruption in 
their cross-country analysis does not necessarily mean that corruption significantly deters FDI 
inflows in China since China-related data only cover 2% of the sample used. Moreover the 
negative coefficient on the China dummy might be due to some unobservable factors rather 
than on corruption since country corruption levels have been controlled simultaneously in their 
regressions. To make a solid finding of the linkage between corruption and FDI inflows in 
China, we will perform a within-country analysis here, controlling for the endogeneity problem 
with both the fixed-effects and instrumental variable approaches. 
      Similar to Harms and Ursprung (2002), we use the regional average annual FDI inflow per 
capita as the dependent variable. Besides the key explanatory variable: corruption, we have, 
following (Wei, 2000a, b), and Egger and Winner (2005), introduced several common controls 
such as income level and education level in our regressions. We first perform the provincial 
analysis. We start with OLS regressions. To address the reverse causation between corruption 
and FDI that Larraín and Tavares (2003, 2007) pointed out, we then perform IV regressions 
with latitudes of provincial capitals as the instrument for provincial corruption in our cross-
sectional analysis, and run fixed effects regressions in our panel analysis. To check the 
robustness of our provincial results, we also perform the city-level analysis. We routinely run 
both the OLS regression and the IV regression with the latitudes of the cities and the big city 
dummy as instruments for the corruption levels of cities.  








            Table 7 
         Effect of corruption rate on inbound FDI: cross-province evidence 
  FDI  per capita 
  Province level (2003-2007)  City level (2004-2007) 
 OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE  OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Corruption   -1.44**  -2.53***  -0.088  -0.77***  -8.52***  -32.09** 
  (0.53) (0.91) (0.19) (0.27)  (3.24) (13.85) 
Income    6.83*** 6.31*** 4.96*** 5.81***  14.78***  14.62*** 
  (1.44) (1.43) (0.63) (0.69)  (3.08) (3.39) 
Education 3.17*  2.31 -0.41  0.79**  0.080  0.096** 
  (1.85) (1.69) (0.46) (0.36)  (0.049)  (0.045) 
Population  0.11  -0.59 -0.37 -1.19***  -8.86*  -12.04** 
  (0.91) (0.98) (0.28) (0.39)  (4.54) (4.82) 
Industrialization 17.59*  25.66*** -0.36  8.98**  -0.13  -0.66** 
  (8.84) (9.87) (3.05) (3.85)  (0.20) (0.34) 
Infrastructure  0.61*** 0.63*** 0.27*** 0.23***  -9.09**  -8.09* 
  (0.083) (0.078) (0.031) (0.034)  (4.55)  (4.37) 
Constant -54.68***  -45.38*** -39.45*** -48.39*** -31.48  39.20 
  (14.22) (15.79) (5.68)  (6.89)  (54.06) (68.22) 
Observations  31 31 303  303  116  116 
R-squared 0.93   0.80 0.88  0.58  
 Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In our city-level 
analysis, Income is represented by its value in 2004 hereafter. And Population is measure by its 
value in 2004 here. 
 
Table 7 shows results that consistent with previous findings. Corruption hinders inward foreign 
direct investment both significantly and robustly in China. Hence the nexus of corruption and 
FDI in China, which has seemed to be perplexing in our cross-country comparison, does indeed 
not contradict prior theoretical and empirical findings. In this sense, China is a normal country. 
Additionally, in line with previous literature, high levels of income and education stimulate 
regional FDI levels significantly. 
We now include another important determinant of inward FDI namely that of pollution 
in our study in order to further investigate the relationship between corruption and inward FDI 
in China. This, in effect, is also the examination of the pollution haven hypothesis in China. 
According to Javorcik and Wei (2004), the pollution haven hypothesis refers to the probability 
that international corporations move to regions with lax environmental regulations. Similar to 
Levinson (1996), we are looking for the within-country evidence of the pollution haven 
hypothesis. We continue to use the regional FDI per capita to indicate the regional inbound FDI 
level. Since the environment policy is formulated by the central government, the regional 
difference of environment stringency in China lies only in the enforcement of the environment 




to capture the regional difference in the enforcement of environment policy and therefore the 
environmental stringency in China.  
In provincial analysis, we start with OLS regressions and then adopt both the IV 
approach in the cross-sectional analysis and the fixed effects approach in the panel regressions 
to address the endogeneity problem. With a similar specification we run OLS and 2SLS 
regressions in our city-level analysis. From the results in Table 8, we find that corruption 
continues to exert a significantly negative effect on local attraction to foreign direct investment 
when considering the environmental stringency. Unfortunately we only have mixed evidence of 
the pollution haven hypothesis in China. A plausible interpretation of our results can be derived 
from Dean, Lovely and Wang (2004). They found that Chinese-sourced FDI is discouraged by 
stringent environmental regulation in Chinese provinces while non-Chinese-sourced FDI is in 
fact attracted to provinces with stringent environmental policy.   
 
              Table 8 
Testing the pollution haven hypothesis: cross-province evidence 
  FDI per capita 
  Province level (2003-2007)  City level (2004-2007) 
 OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE  OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Cases -1.43**  -2.61***  0.035  -0.76***  -8.52**  -32.24** 
  (0.53) (0.91) (0.19) (0.28)  (3.25) (13.78) 
Waste water   5.34  5.24  -4.02**  -2.56**  0.0016  0.0029 
  (3.60) (3.58) (1.75) (1.27)  (0.10) (0.14) 
Income  6.58*** 6.02*** 5.85*** 5.67***  14.77***  14.60*** 
  (1.41) (1.45) (0.79) (0.67)  (3.35) (3.52) 
Education    5.06* 4.10* -0.52 1.14***  0.080 0.096** 
  (2.59) (2.41) (0.58) (0.40)  (0.050)  (0.045) 
Population 0.36 -0.40  -0.053  -1.08***  -8.87*  -12.07** 
  (0.85) (0.99) (0.34) (0.39)  (4.57) (4.86) 
Industrialization   16.60*  25.36** -2.55  10.11**  -0.13  -0.66** 
  (9.04) (10.40)  (3.30) (4.01)  (0.20) (0.34) 
Infrastructure  0.59*** 0.61*** 0.27*** 0.23***  -9.09**  -8.09* 
  (0.084) (0.077) (0.033) (0.034)  (4.58)  (4.38) 
Constant -53.90***  -43.86*** -46.45*** -41.28*** -31.49  39.66 
  (13.53) (15.85) (6.42)  (6.19)  (54.27) (68.19) 
Observations  31 31 301  301  116  116 
R-squared 0.93   0.80 0.88  0.58  
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Waste water 
variable is represented with its value in 2003 in the city-level analysis henceforth. 







Effects of corruption on public finance: cross-province evidence 
  Tax revenue/GRP (2003-07)  Education expenditure/GRP (2003-06)  Science expenditure/GRP (2003-06)  Health expenditure/GRP (2003-06) 
  OLS  POLS  2SLS  FE  OLS POLS  2SLS  FE  OLS POLS 2SLS  FE  OLS POLS  2SLS  FE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Cases -1.07*** -0.52*** -2.33***  -0.54*** -0.076  -0.18*** -0.32**  -0.16***  -0.014  0.0031  -0.061* -0.012*  -0.036 -0.081*** -0.12* -0.080*** 
 (0.33)  (0.084)  (0.71)  (0.11)  (0.078)  (0.041) (0.15)  (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.0047)  (0.033)  (0.0065)  (0.037) (0.014)  (0.069) (0.020) 
Income  1.39  1.24***  -0.16  2.17*** -0.17 -0.22  -0.17 -0.20 0.098*  0.042***  0.091  0.055** 0.0039  0.0012  0.011  0.075 
   (1.49)  (0.28)  (1.48)  (0.39)  (0.21)  (0.16) (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.052)  (0.014)  (0.057) (0.024)  (0.12) (0.056)  (0.13) (0.095) 
Population  0.23  -0.58*** -0.18  -0.82***       -0.022  -0.055***  -0.056 -0.071*** -0.15 -0.46***  -0.18 -0.41*** 
  (0.59)  (0.097)  (0.55)  (0.10)        (0.025)  (0.0066) (0.037) (0.0093)  (0.15) (0.064)  (0.14) (0.060) 
Education 0.49  1.52***  -1.45  1.52***  2.45*** -0.60*** 2.18*** -0.81***  0.16***  -0.017  0.12** -0.036*** 0.99*** -0.26***  0.89*** -0.35*** 
 (1.93)  (0.30)  (1.51)  (0.29)  (0.55)  (0.18) (0.47)  (0.13)  (0.045)  (0.011)  (0.053) (0.011)  (0.22) (0.051)  (0.19) (0.046) 
Urbanization 10.87**  0.95  17.28***  1.83***                0.18**   0.46*** 
  (4.53)  (0.62)  (4.72)  (0.68)                (0.088)   (0.090) 
Industrialization                0.40**    0.72**  0.45***       
                (0.17)    (0.33)  (0.084)       
Students          0.009 -0.038*** 0.002 -0.032***                
          (0.001) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.003)                 
Researchers                0.0074*  0.0045*** 0.0093** 0.0049***      
                (0.0042)  (0.0012)  (0.0040)  (0.0012)       
Sick  beds                       0.022  0.017**  0.023*  0.013* 
                       (0.014)  (0.0075)  (0.013)  (0.0067) 
Central  cities                -0.19*  -0.069**  -0.25**         
                (0.10)  (0.031)  (0.098)         
Constant -6.88  -1.82  8.47  -8.10**  9.03*** 6.49***  9.34*** 7.55***  -0.29  0.27**  0.0077  0.18  3.77** 4.76***  4.07** 3.68*** 
  (12.13) (2.23)  (12.48) (3.23)  (1.45) (1.16) (1.63)  (1.90)  (0.47)  (0.12) (0.62)  (0.23)  (1.76) (0.75)  (1.71) (1.05) 
Observations  31  284 31  284  31 248  31 248  31 248  31  248  31 227  31 227 
R-squared 0.72  0.58    0.75  0.87  0.48   0.75 0.60  0.29    0.52 0.86  0.70   0.81 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Students and Researchers are gauged with their averages for the period from 2003 to 2007. Sick beds are measured with its average 




                    3.4    Corruption and Public Finance 
Bureaucratic corruption also affects government revenue and expenditure. Following Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1998), we examine the effects of corruption on the revenue 
and expenditure of local governments in China. We first explore whether regional corruption 
influences the tax revenue of local government. Then we turn to the association between 
corruption and the composition of government expenditure. Our specification is a bit richer 
than those found in prior studies. Similar to Mauro (1998), we use ratios of tax revenue and 
government expenditures to GDP as dependent variables in regressions. Furthermore we use 
a dummy to indicate municipalities in the regression of tax revenue since they are different 
from others provinces in taxation. To deal with the potential endogeneity bias, we 
instrumented provincial corruption rates here with latitudes of provincial capitals as before. 
Results of IV regressions in Table 9 coincide with those in Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and 
Mauro (1998). Corruption has a significantly negative effect on tax revenue and government 
expenditure on education. Furthermore we find that corruption decreases government 
expenditure on science and health. These findings are reasonable and consistent with Mauro 
(1998)’s theoretical analysis. 
        
 
Table 10 
Effects of corruption on government expenditure: cross-city evidence 
  Education expenditure/GDP    Science expenditure/GDP 
 OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
ETC -0.039  -0.64*    -0.0040  -0.055* 
 (0.10)  (0.35)    (0.0044)  (0.033) 
Income -0.75***  -0.84***    -0.0015  -0.012 
 (0.089)  (0.13)    (0.0038)  (0.0092) 
Population         0.0048  -0.00012 
       (0.0050)  (0.0076) 
Education 0.0030***  0.0037***    0.00031***  0.00031*** 
 (0.00071)  (0.00077)    (0.00005)  (0.00008) 
Students   -0.0076  -0.034       
 (0.032)  (0.037)       
Researchers       0.0085  0.025 
       (0.023)  (0.026) 
Constant 8.30***  9.94***    -0.010  0.18 
 (0.87)  (1.48)    (0.049)  (0.15) 
Observations 120 120   119  119 
R-squared 0.45      0.51   
                                Notes:  Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1. 





                             
  We then retest provincial findings with the city-level data. Due to the lack of data, in this 
instance we only study the impact of corruption upon government expenditures on education 
and science in Chinese cities. We employ latitudes of cities and a dummy indicating “big 
cities” in China (4 municipalities, 31 provincial capitals and 5 cities specifically designated in 
the state plan) as the instruments of ETC since these geographic factors are clearly exogenous 
and closely correlated with the ETC. We conduct first OLS and then IV regressions in order 
to investigate the effect of ETC upon government expenditure on education and science. 
Results in Table 10 support our cross-province findings in Table 9.  
 
 
3.5    Corruption and the Environment 
In this section we will turn to the relationship between corruption and the environment. We 
will first study the association between corruption and pollution. Welsch (2004) and Cole 
(2007) apply simultaneous equations to estimate the effect of corruption on the pollution 
since they assume that besides its direct effect on pollution, corruption also has an indirect 
impact on pollution through lowering income level. However, according to Glaeser and Saks 
(2006), Gundlach and Paldam (2009) and Dong and Torgler (2010), the causality between 
income and corruption is mainly from income to corruption. We can therefore estimate the 
effect of corruption on pollution with a single equation. We use SO2 emission per capita and 
soot emission per capita as alternative measures for pollution emissions. Due to the existence 
of the environmental Kuznets curve (Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler, 2002), we include 
income per capita, its quadratic term and even cubic term in our specification. Following 
Fredriksson, Vollebergh and Dijkgraaf (2004), we also investigate the influence of corruption 
on energy efficiency, an important determinant of the environment in China. We employ the 
energy intensity index (energy consumption per unit of gross regional product) to measure 
regional energy efficiency. We set up a specification similar to the previous study and use 
OLS, 2SLS and fixed effects regressions. The instrumental variables used here are the same 
as above. 
      Results in Table 11 show that corruption exerts a positive effect on per capita emissions. 
It is in line with the findings of Welsch (2004) and Cole (2007) on the direct effect of 
corruption on pollution. Furthermore, similar to Fredriksson, Vollebergh and Dijkgraaf 
(2004), we also observe that corruption significantly enhances energy intensity and thus 
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 SO2 emission per capita (2003-2007)  Soot emission per capita (2003-2007)  Energy efficiency (2005-2007) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (3)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
 OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE  OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE  OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE 
Cases 1.97  16.74** 0.93  3.01***  3.45*  10.57*** 2.15***  1.76***  0.53*  1.57**  0.37*** 0.28***
  (3.30) (8.54)  (0.60)  (0.91)  (1.87) (4.04)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.30)  (0.62)  (0.076) (0.082) 
Income -199.6  3354  -1818*** -1979***  1111  2826**  -451.0**  -514.3*** -1.68**  -1.81*** -0.18  0.0060 
  (1902) (2893)  (477.1)  (399.9)  (1086) (1424)  (203.3)  (164.1)  (0.70)  (0.69)  (0.15)  (0.26) 
Income 
2  14.63  -387.5  195.2*** 216.5***  -120.7  -314.8**  49.59**  57.44***       
  (212.1)  (321.4)  (51.60)  (43.01)  (121.1) (158.3)  (22.00)  (17.67)       
Income 
3 -0.30  14.74  -6.96***  -7.875*** 4.35  11.60** -1.82** -2.13***         
  (7.83) (11.82) (1.86)  (1.54)  (4.47) (5.83)  (0.79)  (0.63)         
Education -6.99  -3.94 0.81** 0.94**  2.29 3.766 0.44***  0.33**  -6.35  -6.74 -0.22  -0.41* 
  (19.19)  (16.76)  (0.36)  (0.37)  (8.32)  (7.67) (0.15) (0.16)  (3.91)  (4.23) (0.14)  (0.21) 
Population -3.92 -2.43  -0.88  -1.39  0.16  0.89 -0.60  -0.54  -0.24  0.14 0.0052  0.055 
  (8.13) (7.72)  (0.98)  (0.97)  (3.08) (3.34)  (0.41)  (0.49)  (0.87)  (0.71)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Openness 0.72  27.87  -4.12  11.20***  -1.46  11.65  -3.67***  2.81**       
  (12.28)  (19.92)  (2.97)  (3.45)  (6.46)  (10.48)  (1.41)  (1.39)       
Expenditure                72.09** 81.89**  9.38*** 8.54***
                (32.74)  (32.74)  (1.36)  (1.77) 
Constant 854.7  -9578  5646***  6040***  -3389  -8424**  1373**  1536***  -2.82  -10.34  1.08  0.0058 
  (5654) (8639)  (1467)  (1235)  (3230) (4253)  (624.4)  (506.9)  (17.92) (14.36)  (2.16)  (2.44) 
Observations  31 31  310  310  31 31  310 310  30  30  120 120 
R-squared 0.06   0.10  0.44  0.25   0.21  0.54  0.67    0.66  0.75 
                      Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We then check the provincial findings with the city-level data. Here we employ SO2 emission 
by industry per capita and soot emission by industry per capita as alternative measures for 
pollution emissions in Chinese cities as we did not have an overall measure of pollution 
emissions at a city level. We therefore use the industrial output per worker instead of GRP 
per capita in our specification in order to explain the pollution emissions. We run OLS 
regressions and 2SLS regressions with the same instruments as those in the previous city-
level analysis. The results in Table 12 clearly support the positive relationship between 
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     SO2 emission 
by industry per capita
         (2005) 
    Soot emission 
by industry per capita 
         (2005) 
  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
ETC  0.0520 40.26* 2.602* 27.69** 
  (4.250) (21.43) (1.522) (11.73) 
Industrial output per worker  26.74  209.6  -153.4  -39.31 
  (247.1) (403.9) (145.7) (204.5) 
(Industrial output per worker)
2 -1.103  -8.327  6.001  1.493 
  (9.681) (15.86) (5.677) (8.019) 
Industrialization 0.512***  1.358**  0.166*  0.694** 
 (0.172)  (0.566)  (0.0846)  (0.322) 
population  -13.47*** -9.365  -3.944*** -1.381 
  (4.212) (6.402) (1.418) (2.832) 
Constant -52.09  -1330  1010  212.9 
 (1582)  (2605)  (936.3)  (1317) 
Observations  120 120 120 120 
R-squared  0.29   0.19  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Industrial 
output per worker and Industrialization are measured with their values in 2005. 
 
 We proceeded to investigate the mechanism through which corruption affects pollution or 
environmental quality. From a different angle, Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and 
Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) argued with similar lobbying models that the level of 
corruption determines the relative importance of bribery versus social welfare to the 
government. This therefore not only directly reduces the stringency of environmental policy  
but also modifies the effect of other factors such as trade liberalization and FDI on the 
environmental policy stringency.  Through the mechanisms detailed above corruption reduces 
the stringency of environmental policy and therefore increases pollution. With the similar 
specifications to Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson  
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(2006), we look here for the within-country evidence of the mechanisms that they suggested. 
We measure the stringency of environment policy with the ratio of industrial waste water 
meeting discharge standards in Chinese regions. We perform OLS, 2SLS, Pooled-OLS and 
fixed effects regressions in turn. We first follow the path of Damania, Fredriksson and List 
(2003) and explore the relationship between corruption, trade liberalization and environment 
policy in Chinese provinces in the first four columns in Table 13. Then similar to Cole, Elliott 
and Fredriksson (2006), we investigate the linkage between corruption, FDI and environment 
policy in Chinese provinces in the last four columns of Table 13. The results in Table 13 
show that provincial corruption has an overall negative effect on the stringency of 
environmental policy at the mean level of provincial FDI per capita or regional trade 
openness. Furthermore the effects of both FDI per capita and trade openness on the regional 
environmental policy stringency are modified by provincial corruption levels in most of the 
regressions in Table 13. All these findings are consistent with those of the two previous 
studies. However, in this instance the manner in which corruption modifies the effects of FDI 
and trade openness on the environmental policy strictness is opposite to that observed by 
Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006). As shown in 
Figure 1, the marginal effects of trade openness and FDI on the environmental policy 
stringency, which are initially negative, increase with local corruption level and become 
positive at within-sample levels of corruption, which contradicts the two previous studies
5. A 
plausible interpretation of our results may be derived from Li and Zhou (2005). They 
observed that the probability of promotion or termination of local leaders depends mainly on 
their economic performance in China, where the Central Government essentially controls the 
mobility of local government leaders. We therefore assume that the local leaders in China 
may consider both promotion benefits and corrupt incomes when they maximize their 
utilities. Moreover the regional corruption level determines the relative importance of bribery 
vs. promotion to the leaders. The local environmental policy to some extent becomes a tool of 
the provincial leaders in China. When the local level of corruption is low, the regional 
leader’s weight on promotion relative to bribery is added. Since exports and investment are 
the main source of economic growth in China (WTO, 2006), the local leader is likely to 
loosen the local environmental policy under the pressure of the export industries in order to 
earn a promotion. Furthermore foreign-invested companies are likely to sustain and even 
improve local economic performance so long as export industries and/or the foreign-invested 
                                                            
5 For example, see Figure 1 in Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006).  
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companies there play important roles in the local economy. In a highly corrupt region, the 
relative importance of bribery versus promotion to the local leader rises. He may have an 
incentive to extort bribes from local firms including foreign-invested companies and export-
oriented firms in industries by the reinforcement of local government regulations including 
environmental ones, provided that there are enough local firms especially those export-
oriented and/or foreign-invested so that he can extort lots of bribes without destroying the 
local economy which may cause his termination. According to this mechanism, trade 
openness and FDI increase the stringency of environmental policy if the local corruption 
level is high, while they decrease the stringency of environmental policy if the local 
corruption level is low. Such an explanation could explain our empirical results. Indeed it is 
because of the unique Chinese political system with centralized personnel control, one of the 
“Chinese characteristics”, that the analyses of Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and 
Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) cannot be applied to China.  
 
Table 13 
 Effect of corruption on environment policy: cross-province evidence 
  Ratio of industrial waste water meeting discharge standards (2003-2007) 
 OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE  OLS  2SLS  POLS  FE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Cases  -0.013 -0.12* -0.018* -0.023** -0.0013  -0.10  -0.011  -0.019** 
  (0.022) (0.063) (0.0093) (0.010)  (0.020) (0.069) (0.0090)  (0.0097) 
Openness -0.20  -0.65**  -0.21***  -0.17**         
  (0.13) (0.25) (0.040) (0.072)         
Cases*Openness 0.052  0.18**  0.061***  0.042***        
  (0.035) (0.083) (0.013)  (0.016)         
FDI        -0.0025  -0.042*  -0.0069*  0.00006 
        (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.0041)  (0.0032) 
Cases*FDI        0.0016  0.011*  0.0031***  0.0014* 
        (0.0021) (0.0060)  (0.00086)  (0.00084) 
Income  -0.96  0.92 1.06***  0.64** -0.96  0.22 1.35***  1.16*** 
  (1.29) (1.00) (0.27)  (0.27)  (1.23) (1.00) (0.35)  (0.26) 
Income 
2 0.055  -0.043  -0.050*** -0.031**  0.053 -0.0047  -0.067***  -0.062***
  (0.068) (0.052) (0.0150) (0.015) (0.066)  (0.052)  (0.020)  (0.014) 
Education -0.099  0.075  0.045**  0.0068  0.10  0.27  0.059***  0.0033 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.020) (0.019) 
Population  -0.0017  0.029  0.052***  -0.013  -0.017 0.0080 0.058***  -0.021 
  (0.042) (0.034) (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.015)  (0.013) 
Expenditure  -1.25*** -1.82*** -0.59***  -0.90*** -3.00**  -3.69*** -0.51***  -0.95*** 
  (0.42) (0.41) (0.11)  (0.14)  (1.19) (1.04) (0.11)  (0.12) 
Constant  5.01 -3.37  -5.075*** -2.17* 6.00 0.66 -6.37***  -4.64*** 
  (5.90) (4.45) (1.227) (1.19)  (5.52) (4.53) (1.59)  (1.24) 
Observations  31 31 303 303  30 30 301 301 
R-squared  0.89   0.58  0.74  0.76   0.58  0.76 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 1   









Note: Marginal effects are calculated with the 2SLS results in Column (2) & (7) in Table 13.  
 
Now we check the findings above with cross-city data. Here we can include new control 
variables into our basic specification due to the data availability. The regional average 
temperature is utilized to control the abundance of water resources since a high regional 
average temperature is often correlated with rich water resources in China. We also add the 
open policy dummy which is equal to 1 if a city is designated to open up to the outside world 
by the central government, and 0 otherwise. This allows controlling for the policy effects in 
relation to international trade and FDI in China. The results in Table 14 are consistent with 
the provincial findings. Corruption on average reduces the environment policy stringency. 
The impacts of trade openness and FDI on the environment regulations are conditional on 
corruption. Moreover the marginal effects of trade openness and FDI on the stringency of 
environmental policy increase with the corruption level from initial negative values to final 
positive values.  
It is worth noting that the impact of the regional income level on the stringency of 
environmental policy is also gauged at both the province level and the city level. As Figure 2 
presents, the negative quadratic relationship between the environmental policy stringency and 
income in our regressions indeed shows that the strictness of environmental policy increases 
with regional income level within our sample
6.  
                                                            
6 We add the quadratic term of income level into our specifications only to guarantee the comparability between our findings 
and those of Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson (2006) as both studies included the 



























































Effects of corruption on environment policy: cross-city evidence 
  Average ratio of industrial waste water 
meeting discharge standards (2005) 
  OLS 2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
ETC -1.82  -17.36** -1.46  -18.25** 
 (1.44)  (7.36)  (1.70)  (7.49) 
Openness -0.0075  -0.066**   
 (0.012)  (0.031)    
ETC*openness 0.012  0.076**    
 (0.012)  (0.035)    
FDI     -0.022 -0.25** 
    (0.042) (0.11) 
ETC*FDI     0.049 0.44** 
    (0.066) (0.19) 
Income 59.99**  71.33**  60.50*  94.82** 
 (23.95)  (30.84)  (30.63) (41.42) 
(Income)
2 -3.09**  -3.85**  -3.10*  -5.19** 
 (1.30)  (1.69)  (1.66)  (2.30) 
Education    -0.012 0.0016 -0.017  -0.0059 
 (0.0097) (0.0095)  (0.012) (0.010) 
Open policy  1.66  3.38*  2.08  3.17 
 (1.23)  (1.99)  (1.38)  (2.03) 
Temperature 0.14  -0.085  0.20  -0.11 
 (0.14)  (0.232)  (0.16)  (0.24) 
Constant -195.9*  -216.9  -201.0  -318.4* 
 (110.9)  (141.1)  (142.2) (185.2) 
Observations 118  118  118  118 
R-squared 0.27    0.24   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 





















Figure 2   
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Note: The figure is drawn with the provincial panel data. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUING REMARKS 
Cross-country analyses in corruption with subjective survey data are suffering from a number 
of biases. A comprehensive case study of a representative country may provide a helpful 
supplement to these studies. In this paper, we investigate the consequences of corruption 
using two objective data sets and alternative corruption measures across Chinese regions. 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) pointed out that the noise of corruption data, the small sample size 
and the narrow variation in cross regions make it difficult for researchers to identify 
relationships between corruption and other variables in a within-country analysis. The 
relatively great regional disparity in China mitigates the problem of narrow variation across 
sub-nations in within-country analysis. We also employ both the instrumental variables 
approach with 5-year averages of variables and the fixed effects approach with a large panel 
data set to address data noise and the endogeneity problems which often cannot be controlled 
in a small sample. The fact that our results are basically consistent with prior findings 
somehow validates our analysis. Furthermore, two complementary data sets and alternative 
corruption measures in our analysis guarantee the robustness of our findings.   
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Our research identifies adverse influences of corruption on economic development 
which have been observed in cross-country studies. Like prior studies, we first observe that 
corruption appears to lower economic growth insignificantly. Unlike previous research, we 
subsequently obtain solid evidence that corruption has both simultaneous positive and 
negative substantial effects on economic growth. The impact of corruption detected in 
literature, either negative or positive, might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects in 
a specific institutional environment. Corruption also affects the income distribution in China 
which is an important aspect of economic development. Similar to cross-country analyses, we 
find that corruption considerably increases income inequality in China. We also find that 
regional corruption significantly reduces inbound foreign direct investment, a main source of 
economic growth in Chinese regions. This finding sheds new light on the “China puzzle” 
(Wei, 2000b): the seemingly positive relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in 
China in the previous cross-country comparison. Moreover the related pollution haven 
hypothesis might not hold in China since we cannot find supporting evidence for it. As to the 
impact of corruption on public expenditure, we observe that corruption significantly 
decreases government spending on education, science and public health. Additionally 
corruption is also found to substantially reduce tax revenue. Turning to the nexus between 
corruption and the environment, we observe that corruption substantially aggravates pollution 
mainly through loosening environment regulations. Furthermore, corruption in China is also 
observed to modify the effects of trade openness and FDI on the environment policy 
stringency in a unique way which is quite different from those suggested in previous studies.  
   In summary, our study casts new light in a broad manner on the consequences of 
corruption especially in developing countries and hence is a constructive complement to 
current research about the consequences of corruption.  
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Variable Data  Description  Source 
Cases  Regional registered cases on corruption in procurator’s 
office  per 100,000 population 
China Procuratorial Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
ETC  Average entertainment and travel costs relative to sales of 
investigated firms in cities 
World Bank (2007) 
Income  Logarithm of  per capita real gross regional product  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
 China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Education  Provincial fraction of the population over 6 with college 
completed 
Public library collections per 100 people in a city 
China Population Statistics Yearbooks (1998-
2008) 
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2004) 
Openness  Regional ratio of import and export to gross regional 
product 
Regional Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Industrialization  Regional industrial contribution to gross regional product  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
 China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Expenditure  Ratio of regional government expenditure to gross 
regional product 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008)  
 China Finance Yearbooks ( 1998-2008) 
FDI  Regional inward foreign direct investment per capita  Statistics of  Ministry of Commerce  of China 
Urbanization  Regional share of urban population  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008)  
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Investment   Regional investment in the fixed assets/ gross regional 
product 
China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
Infrastructure   City road mileage per 10000 people;   World Bank (2007) 
Loan pay  Average investigated firms’ expectation of informal 
payments for loans in a city 
World Bank (2007) 
Tax  Average taxes and fees relative to firms’ sales of firms 
investigated in a city 
World Bank (2007) 
Red tape  Average days per year that enterprise staff must spend 
interacting with four major government bureaucracies 
(tax administration, public security, environmental 
protection, and labour and social security) 
World Bank (2007) 
Students  Regional number of middle school students   China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008)  
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008)  
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Researchers   Regional number of research workers   China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008)      
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Sick beds  Regional number of sick beds   China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008) 
population  Regional population  China Statistical Yearbooks (1998-2008)      
China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
Open policy  Dummy which equals 1if a city is among cities 
designated to open up to the outside world, 0 otherwise 
Several documents issued by the State Council of 
China 
West  Dummy which equals 1 when a region is in West China, 
0 otherwise 
Regional Statistical Yearbook 1998 
Capital  Dummy which equals 1if a city is among bigger cities (4 
municipalities, 31 provincial capitals and 5 cities 
specifically designated in the state plan), 0 otherwise 
 
Latitude  Latitudes of Chinese cities including provincial capitals  Shanghai Astronomical Observatory Online 
(http://www.astron.sh.cn/) 
Temperature  Average temperatures of cities  China Meteorological Data Sharing Service 
System (http://cdc.cma.gov.cn/) 
Others  Industrial output and employment  China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
  All relevant data about public finance (tax revenue & 
public expenditures) 
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China City Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2008) 
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